In our study, we investigate competition in the banking systems of the EU27 as a whole, but also in both old EU member states and new EU member states, in the context of European Union integration and enlargement. Specifically, we construct 2 measures of competition, the Lerner Index and H-statistics, using bank-level data for a panel of 923 commercial banks from the 27 countries that are member states of the EU. The results show a significant increase in competition in new EU members between 2001 and 2006, while in old member states we see a notable decrease in competition between 2005 and 2007. As a whole, competition in the EU27 increases comparatively with 2001, and we consider adoption of the euro and continuing European integration to be the main factors for this issue. Additionally, empirical results provide evidence of convergence in terms of banking competition among the member states of the EU.
Introduction
Recent turmoil in the global financial system has impacted severely on the banking sector, with many banks suffering large losses and being forced to raise additional capital privately or through their national governments. Failure by investors, depositors, and supervisors to appropriately discipline banks has led academics and policy-makers to reconsider the links among bank performance, risk and changes in the competitive environment. Moreover, in recent years, indicators of banking competition have been used by researchers to explain performance and risk differentials across banks.
Intensified competition is one expected benefit of economic integration in the European Union. Competition is generally accepted as a positive influence in most industries, in that it is supposed to have a positive impact on an industry's efficiency. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome set a Single European Market for all goods and services. All discrimination based on nationality was to disappear. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty consolidated the single-market programme. A single European financial market implies that in any of the member states a financial institution of a European Union country is able to function on the basis of the functioning authorization issued by its own country. The First Banking Directive removed obstacles to providing services and establishing branches across the borders of EU member states, harmonized rules for bank licensing and established EU-wide supervisory arrangements. Later, in 1989, the Second Banking Directive on coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions dealt with the start-up and development of activity by credit institutions and aimed to create a single banking market by establishing the principle of mutual recognition of banking permits. The main advantages of the single market are: a) reduced prices for banking and financial services as a consequence of the increase of concurrency among financial institutions; b) general growth of economic efficiency as a result of reduction of the cost for banking and financial services used by companies; c) increase of access to larger categories of markets, instruments and services under the conditions of portfolio diversification and better risk monitoring; and d) greater efficiency of use of capital flows due to free movement. In other words, the single European market would produce many dynamic gains in the form of economies of scale, increased competition resulting in reduction in X-inefficiency and international price discrimination, and an increase in the variety of products available across the market (Howells and Bain, 2007) .
Besides, in recent years the reform of banking systems due to European Union accession and the transition phenomenon from centralized economy to market-based economy in Central and Eastern European countries has involved ample liberalization, privatization and recapitalization of the banking sector. This has resulted in giving much consideration to analysis of competition in banking sectors.
In our study, we investigate competition in banking systems in the EU27 as a whole, but also in both old EU member states and new EU member states, in the context of European Union integration and enlargement. Since 2004, total EU membership has increased twice: in 2004, 10 new member states (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) joined the EU, while in 2007, another 2 (Bulgaria and Romania) entered. The originality of this study consists in assessing competition not only for the EU27 banking systems as a whole, but also for old members' banking systems compared with new members' banking systems. We also take into consideration some effects of the present international financial crisis during the period 2008-2009. After that, we test for convergence on non-structural measures of bank competition. We also assess the relationship between competition and efficiency in EU banking systems using Granger-type causality tests in a comparative manner: old EU members versus new EU members.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews previous literature on banking competition and the relationship between banks' efficiency and competition. In Section 3 we explain the methodology we have used in our analysis and discuss data and variable selection. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the main conclusions.
Literature review
The literature includes some empirical approaches concerning evaluation of competition, the most well-known being "the Structure-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis" (SCP) and the "Efficient Structure Hypothesis" (ESH). The structural approach, as the name suggests, assesses bank competition by examining measures of market structure such as concentration ratios (the share of assets held by the top 3 or 5 institutions) or indices (e.g., the HerfindhalHirschman Index) and supposes that higher concentration in the banking market causes less competitive bank conduct, leading to higher bank profitability. The SCP model was originally developed by Bain (1956) .
The second approach, ESH, developed by Demsetz (1973) and Peltzmann (1977) , suggests that the superior performance of the market leaders determines market structure, implying that higher efficiency produces both higher concentration and greater profitability. "Nonstructural models" do not infer competitive conduct of banks through analysis of market structure. Rather, the New Empirical Industrial Organization approach recognizes that banks behave differently depending on the market structure in which they operate. Non-structural indicators of competition are mainly based on the measures of monopoly power developed by Lerner (1934) . The Lerner Index suggests the mark-up of price over marginal cost: the higher the mark-up, the greater the realized market power. A broad range of studies use the Lerner Index such as Angelini and Cetorelli (1999) , Padoa-Schioppa (2001) , Carbó et al (2003) , Maudos and Perez (2003) , Toolsema (2003), Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos (2004) , Carbó et al (2005) , Carbó et al (2006) , Humphrey et al (2006 , Carbó and Rodriguez (2007) , Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007) , and Carbó et al (2009) . A number of studies have used the Lerner Index in order to try to determine the trend in competitive behavior over time.
An alternative non-structural indicator of the degree of market competition is the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic. The H-statistic measures the extent to which changes in banking costs are reflected in changes in banking revenues. It is calculated as the sum of the ratios of the percentage change in total revenue (from all sources) to the percentage change in the three input prices (funding, labor and capital costs), holding constant total banking output (total assets), leverage, and two balance-sheet composition variables (loans-to-assets and deposits-to-total liabilities). Various studies use H-statistic measures. Some of them examine competition in European countries such as those of Shaffer (1993) , Molyneux et al (1994) , Groeneveld (1998), De Bandt and Davis (2000) , Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki and Staikouras (2004) and Carbó et al (2009) . Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Bikker and Haaf (2002) assessed competition using the H-statistic for a sample of different countries, including European ones. Individual country studies are also available: for Germany - Hempell (2002) and Gischer and Stiele (2008) ; for Italy -Coccorese (2004) ; for Greece - Hondroyiannis et al (1999) and Coccorese (2005) ; for Spain - Maudos and Perez (2003) and Carbó et al (2003) ; and for Finland -Vesala (1995) .
Fewer studies focus on banking-sector competition in developing countries. These include: Gelos and Roldós (2004) , who analyze bank competition in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, and Turkey; Mkrtchyan (2005) , who investigates bank competition in Armenia; Prasad and Ghosh (2005) , who focus on the case of India; Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2007) , who examine banking competition in Latin America; and Anzoategui et al (2010) who focus on competition in the Middle East and North Africa regions. Competition in the Central and Eastern European banking market has rarely been investigated. Yildirim and Philippatos (2003) assessed competition for 14 CEE countries between 1993 and 2000, using the H-statistic. Mamatzakis et al (2005) measure the degree of concentration and competition in 7 South Eastern European banking sectors, using the H-statistic, over the period -2002 . Drakos and Konstantinou (2005 examine competition in the banking sector with the same non-structural indicator for 10 CEE countries for the period 1992-1998. Delis (2010) Previous research that focuses on the link between competition and bank performance has a long empirical tradition. Some studies assess the influence of banks' market power on efficiency. Hicks (1935) first argued the evidence of a negative relationship between market power and efficiency as a consequence of managers' 'quiet life'. This 'quiet life' hypothesis (QLH) considers that monopoly power allows managers to enjoy a share of monopoly rents in the form of discretionary expenses or a reduction of their effort, which generates inefficiencies. Thus, this slack management determines that firms with greater market power are more inefficient. Berger and Hannan (1998) first demonstrated that banks operating in more concentrated markets exhibit lower cost efficiency as a consequence of slack management. They tested this hypothesis on a sample of about 5000 US banks for the years from 1980 to 1989, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a proxy for market power. Other studies replaced the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) with the Lerner Index or H-statistics as a proxy for market power. Some of them support the QLH (Tu and Chen 2000, Solis and Maudos (2008) for Mexico: analysis of the Deposit market rejects the QLH and analysis of the Loans market supports the QLH; Turk Ariss (2010) for his sample of developing countries using cost efficiency, finds that the results support the QLH, but for Profit efficiency the QLH is rejected; and Färe et al (2010) for the Spanish banking system show that the relationship varies according to the level of market power, the component of efficiency evaluated (cost, technical or allocative) and the type of banking firm (commercial bank or savings bank), suggesting that the 'quiet life' might be a reality only for some banks. Comparatively with previous studies on EU countries, we use both non-structural indicators (Lerner Index and H-statistics) across new European Union members and old European Union members over 2001-2009, as well as for the whole EU. Additionally, we go forward and analyze the convergence of banking-competition levels across the EU member states. Finally, we assess the influence of banks' market power on EU banks' efficiency in terms of cost efficiency, testing which hypothesis is confirmed.
Methodology and data
In this section we discuss the empirical model used to assess the level and convergence of competition and we investigate the relationship between competition and efficiency in EU banking systems.
Competition measures
The purpose of this study is to analyze, comparatively, competitive conditions in the banking sectors of European Union countries, both old member countries and new member countries, in light of the reforms implemented in these countries and the tremendous changes in their banking systems using bank-level data.
In the first empirical part of this paper, we estimate the non-structural indicators of competition in order to examine the evolution and level of competition and market power of banks across member states of the European Union for the period 2001-2009. In particular, we measure competition using the Lerner Index and the H-statistic, indicators that are estimated using bank-level data. In the second part of the paper we will assess the convergence of banking competition at the European Union level.
In order to estimate the degree of bank market power we use bank-level data, the approach followed being similar to that of Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007) and 
where p is the price of total assets computed as the ratio of total revenue to total assets, mc is the marginal cost of total assets, and subscripts i and t denote bank and time, respectively. To calculate the Lerner Index, we first estimate the following translog cost function with one output (total assets), three input factors (labor, deposits, and capital), and three netputs (fixed assets, loan loss provisions, equity capital) (Schaeck and Čihák 2008) . (2) where C denotes total cost, and Y is total assets. W is the vector of inputs (labor, funding, and other costs), and E is the vector of netputs (fixed assets, loan loss provisions, and equity capital).
To obtain marginal cost, we differentiate Eq. (2) with respect to Y as follows:
.
To impose standard homogeneity conditions, we scale all profits and input prices by labor costs, and adjust for heteroskedasticity and scale biases by scaling by equity capital. In the case of perfect competition, L=0; under pure monopoly, L = 1; for monopolistic competition L ranges between 0 and 1; and L < 0, implies pricing below marginal cost and could result, for example, in non-optimizing behavior of banks.
Following the empirical strategy pursued by Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Anzoategui et al (2010) , we obtain the H-statistic by estimating the equation ,
where TR is total revenue over total assets, W k is the unit price of input k, Z is a matrix of controls, D is a matrix of year dummies, α 0 denotes bank-level fixed effects, and i and t denote bank and time, respectively. .
Panzar and Rosse (1987) showed that the H-statistic indicates the nature of market structure under the following assumptions: a) banks are profit maximizing; b) banks produce revenue using labor, capital and intermediated funds as inputs; and c) higher input prices are not associated with higher quality services that generate higher revenue.
For accurate identification of the H-statistic using an estimated revenue equation based on a static equilibrium model, it is necessary to assume that markets are in a long-run equilibrium at each point in time when the data are observed. Accordingly, the equilibrium profit rate should be uncorrelated with factor input prices. To test the market equilibrium assumption we estimated the following equation:
,
where R it is the return on assets of bank i in year t, and because it can take on negative values, we compute the dependent variable as .
The log specification is used to improve the regression's goodness of fit and to reduce possible simultaneity bias (De Bandt and Davis 2000).
The estimated value of the H-statistic ranges between -∞ and 1. The H-statistic is smaller than 0 if the underlying market is a monopoly; it ranges between 0 and 1 for monopolistic competition; and an H-statistic of unity indicates perfect competition.
Convergence measures
In order to analyze the convergence of banking-competition levels across the EU member states over the 2001-2009 period, we used the concepts of b-convergence and s-convergence proposed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) . The seminal papers by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw et al (1992) have triggered a huge amount of literature attempting to empirically detect and measure convergence in various contexts. In the case of European countries, studies check whether financial integration takes place in the EU banking markets and whether, as a result, it improves banking sector performance. The studies also check whether convergence is occurring in the banking sector. 
where is the mean level of competition, measured using the Lerner Index, in country j in year t; is the level of competition in country j in year t-1; j = 1,2,...,27 and t = 1,2,...,9; , and are the parameters to be estimated; and is the error term. Then, there is b-convergence if the coefficient b is negative: the higher the coefficient in relative terms, the greater the tendency for convergence. s-convergence is investigated through estimation of the following equation: (8) where, estimated using the Lerner Index, is the mean level of competition of the banking systems from the European Union at time t; , and are parameters to be estimated; and is the error term. A negative value for s parameter implies convergence of toward to .
The empirical models specified in equations (1) - (8) are estimated using the panel least square fixed-effect methodology.
Cost Efficiency measures
In the analysis of the efficiency of the banks in EU member states we used the SFA Method (Stochastic Frontier Analysis). According to the SFA, total cost takes the following specification: ,
where denotes observed total cost for bank i at year t, P is a vector of input prices and Y is a vector of outputs. This approach disentangles the error term into two components. The first, , corresponds to random fluctuations and the second, , accounts for the firm's inefficiency.
For the cost-efficiency function, we apply a translog specification. Restrictions regarding the function of the stochastic frontier are more flexible when a functional form of the translogtype production function is applied than when a functional Cobb-Douglas-type form is applied. The translog form does not impose the hypothesis regarding constant elasticity of the production function or of elasticity of substitution between inputs. Another advantage of the translog form is that it allows data to indicate the real value of the curvature of the function rather than impose prior hypotheses regarding its value. In order to calculate the level of cost efficiency we apply the following equation: ,
where: C is total cost, Y is outputs, and W is price of inputs. The cost-efficiency level is given by the ratio between the minimum cost and the cost registered by the decisional unit and is calculated as:
The SFA method assumes that the inefficiency component of the error term is positive and thus high costs are associated with a high level of inefficiency.
Methodology used to test the relationship and causality between competition and efficiency
In a similar vein to Schaeck and Čihák (2008) and Casu and Girardone (2009) we analyze the link between competition and efficiency in the European banking systems in a Grangercausality manner, formally specified in equation (12) as follows: (12) where EFF it is the level of cost efficiency for bank i in year t, LERNER it represents the measure of the Lerner Index. c is the intercept, α and β are parameters to be estimated, θ is a common time effect, υ is an individual bank specific effect, and e is a disturbance term.
Data
The model is estimated on a panel of 923 commercial banks from the 27 member states of the European Union for the period 2001-2009. In our sample we included only active banks with information available for at least 5 years, and we excluded those banks with missing, negative or zero values for inputs or outputs used in estimation of cost efficiency. In order to estimate non-structural indicators of competition we used the following data set: a) inputs: personnel expenses (PE), fixed assets (FA) and financial capital (sum of total deposits (TD), total money market and short term funding (TMMSTF), and equity (EQ); b) input prices: total personnel expenses over total assets (w1), other operating expenses over fixed assets (w2) and interest expenses over financial capital (w3); c) control microeconomic variables: total capital ratio (TCR), equity to total assets ratio (EQ_TA), credit risk measured as the ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans (CRISK), liquidity risk measured as the ratio of liquid assets to total deposits and short term funds (LA_DSTF); and d) control macroeconomic variables: GDP growth rate -growth in real GDP in per cent, inflation rate -change in annual average retail/ consumer price level in per cent (IR), and level of financial intermediation -domestic credit provided by banking sector percentage of GDP (FINT). Table 1 shows the country averages of the variables used for estimating competition and efficiency measures. 
Empirical results

Competition results
The Lerner Index -the mark-up of price over marginal cost -is used as an indicator of banking competition and varies considerably across European countries. Table 2 shows the means of the Lerner Index -the mark-up of price over marginal cost -across new European Union members and old European Union members over 2001-2009, as well as for the whole EU. Significant cross-country differences exist in these competition measures. The results presented in Table 3 As we can see in Table 4 , for new EU members the mean level of H-statistics (0.7994) is higher than for old EU members (0.6519) in the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . But perhaps the trend of competition at the level of these two groups of countries is more important: During the period analyzed we observed a significant decrease of competition in new EU members and an increase of competition in old EU members. The higher scores of H-statistics of new EU members in the first part of the period assessed (2001 -2003) could be explained by reforms of the transition process of these banking systems from a centralized economy to a market-based economy, as well as by the process of EU accession. These reforms (2001) (2002) (2003) implied higher changes in banking revenues due to changes in banking costs than after 2004. As a whole, the H-statistics for EU27 members do not have a coherent trend. Similar to the findings of previous studies (see, e.g., Delis 2010), the H-statistic varies widely between countries, with Greece presenting the lowest score (0.1538) and Hungary the highest (0.9345). These values indicate, similar to the Lerner Index, a monopolistic competition in most of the countries.
Evaluating convergence of competition
In this section we provide information relating to convergence of competition scores ( A similar result is obtained in the case of σ-convergence, meaning that dispersion of mean competition scores between member states of the European Union was reduced during the 2001-2009 period. σ-convergence indicates how rapidly each country's competition levels are converting to the sample mean.
The results of convergence tests for both groups, old EU members and new EU members, presented in Table 6 , validate and reinforce our main conclusion concerning β-convergence and σ-convergence in banking competition across member states of the European Union, and show that β-convergence and σ-convergence was higher in new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe. Table 7 reports the results of Granger-causality tests. In the first set of estimations, competition, measured as the Lerner Index, is estimated as a function of lagged competition and lagged cost efficiency. The results show that efficiency negatively Granger-causes the Lerner Index -hence, efficiency positively Granger-causes competition -in all three models. Causality is stronger in the case of new member states where, in the equation explaining the Lerner Index, lags of efficiency are jointly different from zero and sum up to -0.31, significant at 5%. In these conditions, the evidence for all groups of countries rejects the efficient structure hypothesis.
The results from the second set of estimations show that the Lerner Index does not Grangercause efficiency in all three models, lags of the Lerner Index are not jointly different from zero and their sum is not significant at 10%. Thus, we can conclude that the results of reverse causality running from competition to efficiency provide little or no evidence that increases/ decreases in market power precede decreases/increases in efficiency. Taking into account this evidence, we can neither reject nor support the 'quiet life' hypothesis.
Conclusions
In our study, we investigate competition in banking systems in the EU27 as a whole, but also in both old EU member states and new EU member states, in the context of European Union integration and enlargement. After that, we test for convergence on non-structural measures of bank competition. We also assess the relationship between competition and efficiency in EU banking systems using Granger-type causality tests in a comparative manner, old EU members versus new EU members.
Our results show that competition in the EU27 had higher scores in 2009 in comparison with 2001 but it does not have a coherent trend. The increase of competition in new members' banking systems could be explained by deregulation and entry of foreign banks through acquisitions or "greenfield" investments. On the other hand, the decrease of competition in old member states between 2005-2007 could be explained by a decrease of interest in the internal market (much more mature) of European multinational banks and their orientations to markets from Central and Eastern European markets, with many more possibilities to increase their profits.
Further proof of this that can be observed in the fact that in 2009 competition decreased in new member markets and, after 2008, it increased in the old member market. This could be explained by the effects of the international financial crisis that made banks from old member states reduce their exposure to new member markets. This evidence makes us draw the conclusion that competition in the EU is due to internationalization of European banks, while deregulation is not sufficient to increase competition. Thus, we could consider that competition in new-member markets is dependent on interest by parental undertakings in these markets. Both non-structural indicators, the Lerner Index and the H-statistic, demonstrate that most countries have monopolistic competition and higher competition in new member states than in old member states.
The results of convergence tests provide evidence of β-convergence and σ-convergence in terms of banking competition among the member states of the European Union and show that convergence was higher in new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe. By investigating the relationship between competition and efficiency in EU banking systems using Granger-type causality tests, we rejected the efficient structure hypothesis, but our findings provide little or no evidence to support or reject the 'quiet life' hypothesis.
From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that country-specific factors, the low market share of local banks and the decreasing interest of foreign banks (from old members or outside the EU) in maintaining their exposure could be the reason for decreasing competition in new member markets. This means that deregulation is not sufficient for continuously increasing competition and EU27 banking-market forces do not behave as a "single European market", even if there is progress. Taking into account the results of investigating the relationship between competition and efficiency in EU banking systems, we can also conclude that an increase in efficiency of banks fosters competition -causality is stronger in the case of new member states, but no evidence supports reverse causality. Under these conditions, policymakers should not count on fostering competition in order to improve banks' efficiency, but their measures should create an environment for improving efficiency of banks in order to increase competition and to take advantage of this phenomenon.
